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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
------------------
SALT LAKE CITY CORP., a 
municipal corporation of 
the State of Utah, Case No. 16128 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
D. WILLIAM LAYTON and 
HELEN LAYTON, his wife, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Salt Lake City (hereinafter 
referred to as "Respondent-City" or "City") brought this 
action in the lower court to obtain injunctive relief to 
refrain Mr. and Mrs. Layton from obstructing and encroaching 
upon a portion of a platted and dedicated street. Mr. and 
Mrs. Layton, Defendants-Appellants (hereinafter referred to 
as "Appellant-Laytons" or "Laytons"), who had erected a 
fence across the street exercising exclusive control and 
possession, now claim the public's interest in the City 
street had been abandoned. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After an Order to Show Cause proceeding and review of 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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memoranda, the lower court ruled, as a matter of law, that 
the public's interest in the street was a fee interest under 
applicable subdivision law; therefore, it was not subject to 
abandonment. In so ruling, it held that the common law 
highway provisions of Chapter 12, Laws of Territory of Utah 
1886, as amended, were not applicable because the street had 
been dedicated as a subdivision in 1897, subsequent to the 
subdivision provisions of Chapter 50, Laws of Territory of 
Utah 1890, as amended. 
The lower court, so ruling, therefore granted the 
City's prayer for injunctive relief. It ordered Appellant-
Laytons to remove their obstructing fence and personal 
property from the street, without taking evidence or making 
a factual determination regarding the allegations of 
abandonment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent-City, seeks to have the lower court's order 
confirmed. 
Respondent-City, would further desire an order 
clarifying what appears to be conflicting statutes and case 
law. This court should rule that the public's interests in 
streets, formally dedicated by way of subdivision plats 
after 1894, may be relinquished only by formal legislative 
vacation act. This is, such dedicated streets are not 
subject to claims of abandonment under the provisions of 
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general highway law, but are controlled by comprehensive 
subdivision laws enacted in 1890 as amended in 1894. 
In the alternative, if this Court should find that a 
dedicated subdivision street prior to the 1911 statutory 
amendments, may be subject to a claim of abandonment by non-
use for five years, under the facts of this case, this 
matter should be remanded to the lower court for a factual 
determination of Appellant-Laytons' claim of abandonment. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The undisputed facts of the case demonstrate the 
following: 
1. The area in question is a portion of a dedicated 
and platted subdivision street identified and known as 
"Pearl Street". (R-2). 
2. Pearl Street is a thirty-three foot (33') side 
street located at approximately 980 West at 1700 South in 
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah (R-2, 6, 7). It runs 
south on the eastern boundary of the following described 
subdivision approximately 721 feet. (R-6, 7). 
3. Said Pearl Street was platted as a part of the 
development of five acre parcels located outside of the 
corporate limits of Salt Lake City known as "Lots 20 and 21 
of the Riverside Plat" of Salt Lake County. (R-7). 
4. The two parcels or lots were developed and 
subdivided in the "Subdivision of Lots 20 and 21, Riverside 
-3-
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Plat" which included four blocks, each containing interior 
lots and inter-connecting streets and alleys, of which Pearl 
Street is one street being situated on the eastern boundary 
of said subdivision. ( R-7). 
5. Said subdivision was originally located outside 
Salt Lake City's corporate boundaries but was formally 
d~dicated and recorded in May of 1897 (R-7, 18) and 
subsequently in 1968 was annexed into Salt Lake City. 
6. Pearl Street has long been used by the public and 
improved between 1700 South and Quayle Avenue, or 
approximately three-quarters of its platted distance. 
(R-2, 3, 6). South of Quayle Avenue, the street is also 
platted: however, it is unpaved. (R-2, 6). 
7. The portion of Pearl Street in dispute hereinafter 
referred to as "Street", is the unpaved portion south of 
Quayle Avenue. At this intersection Appellant-Layton 
erected a fence in approximately 1976 thereby prohibiting 
the public or abutting property owners from any use or 
access to, through or from said Street. (R-2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 
18) No vacation of this portion of the Street has been 
alleged and the Street still appears as a platted dedicated 
street on the official maps of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's office. ( R-6). 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AFTER 1890, THE ACT OF PLATTING AND 
FORMALLY DEDICATING STREETS rn A RECORDF.:D 
SUBDIVISION PLAT TRANSFERS TO THE PUBLIC 
AN INTEREST IN THE FEE TITLE, RATHER THAN 
A RIGHT-OF-WAY, THEREFORE, APPELLANT-
LAYTONS' CLAIM OF ABANDONMENT THROUGH 
NON-USE BY THE PUBLIC WAS PROPERLY 
REJECTED BY THE LOWER COURT. 
Traditionally, there have been two methods by which 
public roads are established: (a) formally, through 
governmental dedication, including subdivision platting, 
where landowner desires to develop or subdivide his 
property, and (b) informally, where the roadway has evolved 
by necessity, with or without the landowner's consent. 
Historically, the latter method of creating roads 
occurs first. As unpopulated areas (such as Utah) became 
settled with pioneers, trails were broadened to accomodate 
wagons, creating roads. As these roads generated traffic, 
they were improved by widening, grading and eventually 
hardsurfacing to accommodate the common mode of 
transportation and, thus, became our modern public road 
system. 
Such roads were generally located in unincorporated 
rural areas and reflected the need to travel from point •A" 
to point "B". These roads created a prescriptive easement 
or right-of-way for the public, with or without consent of 
the original owner, under common law principles. 
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Utah recognized this common law and ruled that the 
public's interest in such public roads was a right-of-way. 
Eventually, as Utah's demand for highway improvement 
increased, the territorial legislature formally dealt with 
public highways in Chapter 12, Laws of Territory of Utah of 
1886. This law enabled the public to establish, survey and 
even condemn rights-of-way for public highways and specified 
the types of interests, rights and consequences of 
establishing such highways. Specific provisions, which 
Appellant-Laytons argue are applicable to this controversy, 
include Sections 2, 6 and 7; those sections read as follows: 
"Section 2. All roads, streets, alleys and 
bridges laid out or erected by others than the 
public and dedicated or abandoned to the use 
of the public, are highways. A highway shall 
be deemed and taken as dedicated and abandoned 
to the use of the public when it has been 
continuously and uninterruptedly used as a 
public thoroughfare for a period of ten years. 
"Section 6. A road not worked or used for a 
period of five years ceases to be a highway. 
"Section 7. By taking or accepting land for a 
highway, the public acquire only the right-of-
way and incidents necessary to enjoying and 
maintaining it. A transfer of land bounded by 
a highway, passes the title of the person 
whose estate is transferred, to the center of 
the highway." Chapter 12, Laws of Utah 1886 
(Emphasis added). 
said sections provided that a road became a public 
highway: (a) when offered or devoted to use as a public 
thoroughfare, by means other than acquisition, and (b) where 
accepted by the public by actual use, through formal 
-6-
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acceptance, or otherwise. Sµch public acts.create a 
presumption of public acceptance, after ten years of actual 
use. Specifically, it is to be noted that there is no 
requirement or procedure requiring formal dedication. 
The public's right-of-way interest in such highways 
continued, subject to a claim of abandonment. However, to 
demonstrate an "abandonment", it was necessary to establish 
"non-use" for a period of at least five years; further, it 
was the county court's duty, by regulation, to abolish or 
abandon an unnecessary road. 
Subsequently, said sections 2, 6 and 7 and were 
respectively renumbered as Sections 2066, 2070 and 2071 in 
the Compiled Laws of Utah, 1888. Later, these were amended 
and renumbered in the recodification of Revised Statutes of 
Utah of 1898 - the date most applicable to the establishment 
of Pearl Street, commencing in 1897. Significantly, 
Sections 2 and 7 were adopted respectively as Sections 1114, 
1115 ann 1120, R.S., 1898; however a material 1898 amendment 
to Section 6 was adopted. 
This 1898 amendment emasculated the 5 year abandonment 
provision by eliminating the purported self-executing 
language. The new statutory language created a rebuttable 
presumption in favor of the continuity of the public's 
interest. The law specifically read as follows: 
"1116. Continue until abandoned. A!_!. 
highways once established continue to be 
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highways until abandoned by order of the board 
of county 9ommissioners of the county in which 
~hey are situated, by operation of law or by 
]udg~ent of a court of competent jurisdiction~ 
p~ovided, that a road not used for a period of 
five years ceases to be a highway." (Emphasis 
added). 
In 1911 this section was amended again. This change 
eliminated the five year non-use period altogether, as a 
claim against the presumption of contin~ed public 
interest. The law reads as follows: 
"1116. Continue until abandoned. All 
highways once established ~ust continue to be 
highways until abandoned by the order of the 
Board of County Commissioners of the county in 
which they are situated, or by judgment of a 
court of competent jurisdiction." §1116 
Compiled Laws of Utah 1907, as amended. 
Said Sections 1114, 1115, 1116 as amended in 1911, to 
eliminate the rebuttable presumption claims of non-use, were 
later succeeded (with minor amendments) by Sections 2801, 
2802 and 2806, Compiled Laws of Utah of 1917, Sections 36-1-
2, 36-1-3 and 36-1-7 in the Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933. They were later included in the Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 in Title 27, but repealed in 1963. 
However, the legislature reenacted the presumption of 
public use after ten years in Sections 27-12-89 and 27-12-
90, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended. This law now still 
requires a formal vacation or abandonment action by 
applicable public entities or by the courts. Further, 
section 27-12-101 of the present law now clarifies the 
-'8-
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legislative interest and specifically states that the 
public's property interest may be fee simple or any lesser 
interest. 
Consequently, had the unimproved portion of Pearl 
Street been platted as a highway prior to 1890, rather than 
as a subdivision street after 1890, it would have been 
possible for the County Commission to vacate the highway. 
The road also could have been vacated by court order. 
However, such action could only have been taken if it were 
factually established that the public had failed to accept 
the dedication through actual use or improvement. Such non-
use or improvement may have constituted an "abandonment" of 
the public's interest, as Appellant-Laytons assert in the 
case before the bar. 
However, the subdivision in the instant case was filed 
after 1890. Further, the Appellant-Laytons' predecessors 
did not obtain such a declaration or vacation action during 
the following century. In addition, they did not pay taxes 
on the property. 
As early as 1890 the Utah legislature did recognize the 
increasing demand for urbanization and municipal-type 
services, which resulted in the subdivision development of 
agricultural parcels of land. That body understood the 
state's growth would be best served by subdivision platting, 
where the interest dedicated to the public, by operation of 
-9-
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law, was an interest in the fee title. Hence, it enacted a 
second and more comprehensive formal procedure for 
subdivision development. This procedure deviated from the 
common law applicable to highways and provided: 
·"Such maps and plats when made, acknowledged, 
filed and recorded with the county recorder, 
shall be a dedication of all such avenues, 
streets, lanes, alleys, commons, or other 
public places or blocks and sufficient to vest 
the fee of such parcels of land as therein 
expressed, named or intended, for public uses 
for the inhabitants of such town and for the 
public for the uses therein named or 
intended." Section 4, Chapter SO, Laws of the 
Territory of Utah, 1890 (Emphasis added). 
Said statute was subsequently renumbered as Section 2014 of 
the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898 and Compiled Laws of Utah 
of 1907; Section 5024 of Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, 
Section 78-5-4 of Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933 and Utah 
Code Annotated 1943, and is found today almost verbatim at 
Section 57-5-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
Therefore, as a matter of law, the recording of the 
"Subdivision of Lots 20 and 21, Riverside Plat" and the 
concurrent formal dedication of Pearl Street in May of 1897, 
transferred to the public a fee interest, under the 
subdivision laws enacted in 1890. This dedication occurred 
under the operation of statutory law and not the operation 
of common law principles, reflected by the statutes relating 
to highways as urged by Appellant-Laytons. 
The nature of the public's interest in a platted 
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subdivision street, which has not been developed or 
improved, has also been addressed by this Court in the case 
of North Tern le Investment Car oration v. Salt Lake Cit , 26 
U.2d 306, 489 P.2d 106 (1971). In this case, the plaintiff 
desired to quiet title of unimproved roads dedicated in a 
subdivision which was recorded in 1889. The Court found 
that the street had been platted and dedicated prior to the 
effective date of said Section 4 of Chapter SO of the~ 
of the Territory of Utah of 1890. Therefore, it held that 
the subdivision provisions of the 1890 statute were not 
applicable. Thus, the court ruled the right-of-way offered 
to the public under the highway provisions had not been 
validly accepted by the public, as a matter of law, because 
there had been no actual use. Therefore, the public's 
interest was lost. 
In comparing the laws dealing with dedication of 
highways to the method of formal subdivision dedication, the 
Court indicated the result would have been different, if the 
street had been platted after 1890 because of the 
application of the subdivision law. It explained: 
"A comparison of the two statutes clearly. 
indicates that the earlier enactment required 
the actual establishment and opening of a 
street to common or public use, which would.be 
the equivalent of an acceptance by the public 
user. The subsequent enactment by Se~tio~ 4, 
designated an additional means of dedication, 
whereby upon the making and fi~ing of.a plat, 
the title to land vested immediately in the 
public for uses specified, and no acceptance 
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was necessary. Implicit within the earlier 
statute was a requirement of an acceptance to 
have a valid dedication." North Temple 
Investment Corp. v. Salt Lake City supra at 
p. 107 {Emphasis added). ' 
This language of the North Temple, supra, case together 
wtih the case of Tooele v. Elkington, 100 u. 485 116 P.2d 
406 {1941), clearly demonstrates that Appellant-Laytons' 
argument on page 5 of their Brief is in errnr and without 
merit. The subdivision and street dedication was accepted 
as a matter of law under the applicable statutory law. 
Therefore, Judge Winder's decision that the common law 
provisions relating to highways are not applicable to this 
subdivision Street should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE FEE SIMPLE INTEREST TRANSFERRED TO 
THE PUBLIC BY FORMAL DEDICATION OF A 
SUBDIVISION STREET IS DETERMINABLE BY THE 
POWERS GRANTED AND THE MANNER PROSCRIBED 
BY STATUTE. 
The specific extent or nature of the ownership interest 
vested in the public, by operation of law, upon the 
recording of an approved subdivision plat was interpreted by 
this Court as being "determinable" in nature, as early as 
1909 when the court ruled: 
"While the word 'fee' is used in the section 
[Section 4, Chapter 50, Laws of ?tah 1890], it 
is clear from what follows that it was not 
intended that the fee of the corpus or land 
itself should pass, but only the fee to the 
surface, and this only for public ~urpos~ for 
a street or highway. The fee mention~d.in the 
statute was thus what is known as a limited or 
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determinable fee, and was created for a 
spe~1al purpose or purposes only, ann hence 
suhJect of abandon~ent." Sowadzki v. Salt 
Lake County, 36 u. 127, 104 P. 111 at 116 
(1909). See, also Mallory v. Taggart, 24 u.2d 
267, 470 P.2d 254 (1970). (Emphasis added). 
It should be noted, however, that the restrictive 
language above quoted has subsequently been distinguished 
and explained by the Court in White v. Salt Lake City, 121 
u. 134, 239 P.2d 310 (1952). In this case an owner of 
property abutting a dedicated subdivision street in Salt 
Lake County, sued Salt Lake City for wrongfully laying pipes 
for a water system in the public roadwayt the suit was filed 
notwithstanding the fact that the act was done with the 
permission of the county commission. 
Importantly, the Court found the "fee interest" 
extended beyond the surface and distinguished Sowadzki. The 
Court held that the modern evolution of public utilities, 
together with the widespread and ever-increasing use and 
demand for public utilities, have led to varied uses of the 
streets and highways. It found that such adaptations and 
more extensive uses may not have been contemplated by the 
original dedicator, but they are the natural progression and 
development of maintaining streets for public purposes and 
satisfying the legitimate public need. The Court succinctly 
held: 
"But as long as the dedicated street remains 
platted as a public thoroughfare, the 
statutory provision that the fee iS-Vested in 
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~he county commissioners can only be 
interpreted to mean that the rights of the 
county, acting through its commissioners are superi~r to those of the abutting proper~y 
owner insofar as the normal use of the street 
is concerned. We have clearly changed by 
statute the old common-law rule insofar as 
streets in platted subdivisions are 
concerned." White v. Salt Lake City, supra at 
p. 213. (Emphasis added). 
It is also a well established principles that any 
public interest acquired or public power vested in the 
State's political subdivisions may only be retained, 
exercised or relinquished only in strict conformity with the 
applicable state enabling authority and procedures. See 
White v. Salt Lake County, supra, and Tooele v. Elkington, 
supra. 
Respondent-City submits that the lower court was 
correct in finding that the public's interest in the 
subdivision street was a fee interest determinable only by 
affirmative actions that would conform to the statutory 
requirements governing the relinquishment of interests in 
subdivisions. We suggest the Court must direct itself to 
the power and manner in which the public's vested fee 
interest in a subdivision street could be terminated or 
abandoned under the subdivision laws and determine if such 
action occurred. 
POINT III 
APPELLANTS' ALLEGATION THAT THE PUBLIC'S 
INTEREST IN THE DEDICATED SUBDIVISION 
STREET WAS ABANDONED BY NON-USE IN 1902, 
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BASED ON SECTION 6, CHAPTER 12, LAWS OF 
TERRITORY OF UTAH, 1886 FAILS TO 
CONSIDER: APPLICABLE LAW; THE STATUTORY 
FORMAL PROCEDURE FOR CREATION AND 
TERMINATION OF DEDICATED SUBDIVISION 
STREETS; THE ABSENCE OF PUBLIC ENTITY'S 
ACT TO VACATE OR OTHERWISE DISPOSE OF 
PUBLIC'S INTEREST IN SUBDIVISION STREETS 
IN CONFORMITY WITH STATUTORY POWERS AND 
PROCEDURES. 
A. SECTION 6, CHAPTER 12, LAWS OF TERRITORY 
OF UTAH, 1886, CITED AS BEING SELF 
EXECUTING AND DETERMINATIVE OF THE 
PARTIES' PROPERTY RIGHTS WAS NOT IN 
EFFECT IN 1897 OR 1902; FURTHER IT IS NOT 
RELEVANT. 
On pages 2 and 3 of Appellant-Laytons' Brief, it is 
argued that Section 6 of Chapter 12 of the Laws of the 
Territory of Utah of 1886, which provided a highway not used 
for five years ceased to be a highway, was self-executing in 
nature. It is further argued that the law automatically 
divested the public in 1902 of any rights transferred by the 
formal dedication. This argument may have had some 
applicaton to a case where a street had been laid out (but 
not formally platted as a subdivision) but had no actual use 
prior to 1898. However, such argument has no validity after 
1898. 
Said Section 6, codified as Section 2070, Compiled Laws 
of Utah, 1888, was not in effect in 1897. It had been 
amended in section 1116, Revised Statutes of Utah 1898 and 
the amendment eliminated any reference to the self-executing 
clause. This amendment reversed the law creating a 
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presumption in favor of continued use and made "non-use" a 
conditional exception to rebut the presumption. To overcome 
the presumption, an affirmative act of a court or the board 
of county commissioners was required; the law provided: 
"Section 1116. Continue until abandoned. All 
highways once established continue to be 
highways until abandoned by order of the 
county commissioners of the county in which 
they are situated, by operation of law or by 
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction; 
provided, that a road not used, worked for a 
period of five years ceases to be a highway." 
The following cases cited by Appellant-Laytons in support of 
the argument on page 3 of their Brief, are clearly 
distinguishable on their facts. Each involved streets where 
the alleged 5 years of non-use accrued prior to 1898. Thus, 
they are controlled by a different statute than applicable 
to the case before the bar. Therefore, the cases are not in 
point and are irrelevant; to-wit: Mallory v. Taggart, 
supra, (platted in 1890 - 5 year period ending 1895 and 
disputed opening in 1907); North Temple Investment 
Corporation v. Salt Lake City, Utah, supra, (streets platted 
in 1889 - 1894, quiet title action in 1971); Ludlow v. Salt 
Lake County, 28 U.2d 139, 499 P.2d 283 (1972), (platted in 
1890 - 1895, disputed opening in 1968); Sowadzki v. Salt 
Lake County, supra, (platted in 1890 - 1895, disputed 
opening 1907); Howell v. King County, 16 Wash.2d 557, 134 
P.2d 80, 150 ALR 540 (1943), (statute similar to Section 6 
platted in 1891 - 1895, disputing vacation prior to 1909 
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amendment); Hislop v. County of Lincoln, 249 ore. 259, 4 37 
P.2d 847 (1967). 
Each of the foregoing cases ma~,, also, be distinguished 
from the case at bar because they involve subdivision 
streets platted and remaining in unincorporated areas - not 
property subdivided in the county, later annexed to a 
city. It is interesting to note that each of the above 
mentioned Utah cases imply the public's interest in 
subdivision streets would not be subject to abandonment if 
they had been a city street. 
Consequently, Appellant-Laytons' argument relies on a 
prior statute, not in effect in 1897, and must fail as 
irrelevant. 
B. CONSIDERATON OF THE APPLICABLE LAW 
REFLECTS TWO SEPARATE, DISTINCT AND 
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE METHODS FOR 
ESTABLISHING AND RELINQUISHING THE 
PUBLIC'S INTERESTS IN STREETS. 
As set forth earlier, the trial court correctly found 
that in 1897, there were two different statutory methods for 
recognition and dedication of highways or streets in Utah. 
Each statutory scheme was distinct and mutually exclusive in 
the manner by which a dedication may occur·. The law was 
also specific regarding the nature of the public's interests 
and the procedure or method of changing or terminating such 
an interest. 
The common law scheme presumed that a road, used for 
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ten years, transferred a right-of-way to the public. Thus, 
it was available to the public for continued use, unless 
abandoned for 5 years. This rule was reflected in Sections 
1114, 1115, 1116 and 1120 of the general provisions of 
Chapter 1 Title 25 R.S. 1898. 
However, Section 1134 of said statute also vests the 
responsibility in the board of county commissioners to 
acquire and condemn highways. It, additionally, gave the 
county the power and the duty to "abolish and abandon 
streets unnecessary for the public's use". Importantly, the 
duty and power to "abolish" found in Section 1134 was 
consistent with the 1898 amendment of Section 1116, which 
provided that the public's right-of-way continued, until set 
aside by an affirmative action of the commisson or a 
court. It is obvious that this procedure of commission or 
court review was designed to formalize a standard method for 
adjudicating a dispute over the public's interest in 
highways, created by informal methods. 
However, this scheme was entirely distinct and 
exclusive from the formal subdivision provisions found at 
section 2011 et seq. in Chapter 6 of the Real Estate Law in 
Title 56, R.S. 1898. This law reflected demands of urban 
development. A qualifying developer could plat out and 
dedicate the fee interest to streets for orderly growth. 
Thus, a developer could sell lots and obtain public 
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services, if he followed designated subdivision approval 
procedures. The buying public was likewise protected 
through the platting procedure. 
Sections 2016-2020 (originally enacted in Chapter 18, 
Laws of Territory of Utah, 1894) established enabling 
authority for cities and counties to vacate portions or all 
of formal subdivisions. This law created a procedure by 
which the earlier dedication could be modified or abandoned, 
with an act having the equal dignity of the original 
dedication. The requirement of a formal vacation action to 
vacate subdivision streets of Section 2016 R.S. 1898 was 
analogous to the requirements of Section 1134 and are 
harmonious with the affirmative acts required under Section 
1116. 
The Respondent-City submits that this requirement of an 
official public action to vacate the public's interest in a 
subdivision street, applied to the street in question in 
1897 as well as today. The position was partially clarified 
(at least for cities) in 1898. In this law the legislature 
clarified that a city's interest in land could not be 
adversely possessed, notwithstanding the duration of the 
encroachment by an abutting property owner. It reads as 
follows: 
"No person shall be allowed to acquire any 
right or title in or to any lands hel~ ~y any 
town or city, or the corporate authorities 
thereof, designated for public use as streets, 
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lanes, avenues, alleys, parks, public squares 
or for other purposes, by adverse possession 
thereof for any length of time whatsoever." 
§38~1 Laws of Utah, 1899. See, also Tooele v. 
Elkington, supra, 409. 
Utah case law has, also, interpreted the laws providing 
for public highways, until affirmatively vacated in 
unincorporated areas, to prohibit abutting property owners 
from obtaining rights in public rights-of-way by adverse 
possession. At point is the case of Clark v. Erekson, 9 
U.2d 212, 341 P.2d 424 (1959). Here the Court held that a 
lane used by the public for at least 50 years could not be 
claimed as abandoned due to a 30 year presence of 
obstructions which the Court ordered removed. 
The Respondent-City respectfully submits that 
Appellant-Laytons' argument that methods of dedication were 
interchangeable in terms of impact and legal consequences 
simply is not supported by the law. After 1890, street 
dedication by formal subdivision plat, created an entirely 
new, separate and distinct area of property law. This new 
concept was mutually exclusive of general highway laws and 
continues to this day. It has provided predictability and 
efficiency in the delivery of public services and aided 
urban growth 
In the instant case, the predecessors-in-interest of 
Appellant-Laytons selectea a method of property development 
by platting ana dedicating a formal subdivision, including 
-20-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Pearl Street. They reaped the benefits of that formal 
subdivision platting and, likewise, are bound by the 
consequences and provisions of the method selected. Thus, 
Appellant-Laytons cannot now assert common law abandonment 
of this Street. 
As an aside, it is also important to note that one 
substantial advantage gained by a developer who selects 
formal subdivision, is the removal of the dedicated street 
system from the tax rolls. Since 1897 no property taxes 
have been assessed or paid upon this property. This fact 
suggests the public's continued investment in keeping this 
area public by waiving taxes otherwise attributable to it. 
The Appellant-Laytons should not reap such a tax windfall 
and the public investment should not be lost, without a 
knowing and formal action undertaken as required in the 
statutes. 
Respondent-City submits that Utah law and cases clearly 
demonstrates that the public's fee interest in a dedicated 
subdivision, after 1894, could only be relinquished by a 
formal action of the city or county. Such a knowing 
vacation of a road can then be done under a reasoned 
analysis and after a finding that the public's interest will 
best be served. rt is respectfully submitted that the 
applicable statutes so provide and this court should so 
rule. For authority see Tooele v. Elkington, supra: White 
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v. Salt Lake City, supra; Boskovich v. Midvale, 212 U.2d 
445, 243 P.2d 435 (1952); Ercanbrack v. Judd, 524 P.2d 595 
(1974); Sears v. Ogden, 533 P.2d 118, (1975), affirmed on 
rehearing, 537 P.2d 1029 (1975) and reversed by implication 
572 P.2d 1359 (1977). 
POINT IV 
PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND WEIGHING 
OF INTERESTS SUPPORT ~HE SUPERIORITY OF 
THE PUBLIC'S FEE DETERMINABLE INTEREST 
OVER THE REVF.RSIONARY RIGHTS OF 
APPELLANT-LAYTONS. 
The Appellant-Laytons claim that the public's interest 
in the Street may have been informally abandoned by non-use 
in 1902. Even if one accepts, arguendo, that this position 
has a glimmer of merit, the writer submits public policy and 
equity require the Court to affirm the superiority of the 
public's interest in this Street. The following reasons are 
respectfully submitted; to-wit: 
1. After 1898, the statutory presumption against 
abandonment by non-use would prohibit any reversionary 
rights from becoming superior to the public's interest, 
without affirmative action by county or court. In 1902, 
only a claim would have existed - not a self-executing 
vested right. After 1911, the five year "non-use" provision 
was completely eliminated and any unexercised claim was 
extinguished, in a statutory provision similar to 
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establishment of a statute of limitations. 
2. The statutory subdivision dedication was a 
voluntary and affirmative act of the Appellant-Laytons' 
predecessor-in-interest. He selected the method of formal 
subdivision dedication with the attendant laws, benefits and 
restrictions. These benefits included the bargained for tax 
relief, through the elimination of property taxes on the 
dedicated streets. Furthermore, the developer sold lots and 
improved the north portion of Pearl Street. 
It is important to note that Appellant-Laytons had 
actual notice that their property was subdivided lots with 
frontage on dedicated roads. Thus they succeeded to the 
benefits afforded to their predecessor-in-interest. In 
addition, Appellant-Laytons have known since acquisition 
that they purchased subdivision lots, without title or tax 
to the platted streets. 
It is respectfully submitted that said parties should 
be estopped by equitable doctrine of !aches from challenging 
the public's interest in this street, expecially since such 
claim is over 80 years old. 
3. It is clearly established that had the subject 
Street been annexed prior to platting in 1897 or before 
1899, that the public's interest in the streets would not be 
subject to such a claim of abandonment or informal 
vacation. see Sowadzki v. s.L. County, supra; Tooele v. 
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Elkington, supra; White v. Salt Lake City, supra; and 
Mallory v. Taggart, supra. This property is within the 
Plaintiff-Respondent's corporate limits and the reasoning 
supporting the finding of the above cases would apply to the 
controversy before the court. 
The Utah legislature in 1911 recognized that the public 
purpose and policy for cutting off claims of non-use or 
"abandonment" of platted dedicated streets applied equally 
to cities and to counties, as indicated in the White case. 
It attempted to clarify any ambiguity by eliminating the 
language creating claims. 
4. Any adverse impact of this statutory amendment on 
property owners is either non-existent or is diminimus, when 
compared to the value received by these property owners. 
For example, in the intervening 80 years since the 
legislation, the property owners have had unfettered control 
and use of the undeveloped dedicated roadway property so 
long as it did not conflict with public rights or needs. 
Further, they have had such use without paying any taxes. 
In addition, they have had all of the benefits that came 
from the subdivision platting itself. 
s. Recognition and preservation of the public's 
interest in a street benefits all parties concerned. This 
fact is particularly true where an abutting land owner 
desiring development, may bear the expense of improving the 
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street because, by improving access and increasing the 
opportunity for development of Appellant-Laytons' property, 
their property values are enhanced. 
6. With the increasing and continuing demand by 
unincorporated areas for annexation to enable them to 
receive urban services, chaos and substantial disruption to 
both cities and counties may occur, if the claims of 
Appellant-Laytons are allowed to prevail. 
The natural extension of street improvements would be 
jeopardized because every unimproved, but platted 
subdivision street would be vulnerable to attack for 
abandonment. This result could be disastrous to the orderly 
development of these platted subdivision areas as economies 
make such development feasible. Approving construction and 
obtaining financing in these platted subdivision areas would 
easily be thwarted, cutting off natural, logical growth and 
development of the city or county. 
Such may be the impact of a reversal of the trial 
court's order, as demonstrated by this case. Here the owner 
of a lot, abutting the Street to the east (part of an 
adjoining subdivision), would not have the benefit of 
building any projected building because of a lack of access 
from Pearl Street. Thus, if Appellant-Laytons' position 
were adopted by this court, the City will lose the chance of 
increasing the business tax base, increasing employment 
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opportunities, etc. 
Contrarywise, Appellant-Laytons will lose a 33 foot 
strip of land, wrongfully possessed, which is diminimis to 
its substantial holdings at that location. However, they 
would gain a great deal by improved access and possibilities 
of future development. 
Respondent, Salt Lake City, respectfully submits that 
if this Court reaches the point where it must consider such 
issues that, like the Court in the Tooele v. Elkington case, 
it will conclude the balance of justice tips the scales in 
the favor of the public's interest in its streets. 
POINT V 
THE ALLEGED RIGHTS WHICH MAY ACCRUE TO A 
NON-CONTRIBUTING PROPERTY OWNER ABUTTING 
A DEDICATED SUBDIVISION STREET, SEPARATE 
AND APART FROM THE PUBLIC'S INTEREST IS 
MISSTATED BY DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, BUT 
IS IRRELEVANT AND NOT IN CONTROVERSY. 
Appellant-Laytons have devoted nearly one-third of 
their brief to support the position that owners of property, 
having frontage on but not contributing to the property 
dedicated for street purposes, may not acquire interests in 
the use of said street, separate and apart from the public's 
interest (which they assert was abandoned). In reaching 
this position, the Laytons inconsistently attempt to evade 
the provisions of the common law they rely upon to support 
their claim of common law abandonment. They jump to the 
principle of subdivision law regarding the effect of street 
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vacations. 
Such a selective jump between two separate and very 
different set of property laws, demonstrate their existence 
as argued above under Point IIIB. More importantly, 
however, the argument is incorrect and distortion of the 
property law principles established. 
In making this argument, opposition relies upon a 
Kansas case, where subdivision laws relating to the effect 
of a vacation of the public's fee interest are similar to 
Utah law. The case, Neil v. Independent Realty Company, 317 
Mo. 1235, 298 s.w. 363 (1927} 70 ALR 550, involved a dispute 
over rights to a road which was vacated, but where one 
abutting property owner's predecessor-in-interest had not 
contributed to the dedication. 
The writer submits that the case does stand for the 
proposition that, when a platted and dedicated subdivision 
street is formally vacated, that statutory vacation 
procedure supercedes the common law provisions. This 
statutory method relinquishes the public's interest, without 
disturbing the underlying reversionary fee interests of the 
dedicator. In a case where abutting property owners do not 
share a 'common chain of title with the dedicator, then non-
contributors gain nothing from the vacation, however, 
neither do they lose any private rights which may have been 
established, which would survive vacation or abandonment. 
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See Sears v. Ogden, (1977 case) supra; Ercanbrack v. Judd, 
supra; White v. S.L.C., supra and Boscovich v. Midvale, 
supra. 
Although non-contributing owners of property abutting 
this street may or may not have private rights in the 
Street, this matter is not in controversy and the Court has 
no jurisdiction over that issue where the owner is not a 
party of this litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
The public's interest in said dedicated subdivision 
Street - in the nature of a fee simple determinable - is 
superior to the Appellant-Laytons' reversionary interest as 
an owner of abutting subdivision property under the property 
law applicable to subdivisions. Respondent-City submits it 
is entitled to an order confirming the lower court's order 
preserving the public's interest and requiring the removal 
of Appellant-Laytons' obstructing fence and encroaching 
personal property; specifically: 
1. The public's interest in subdivision streets or 
highways may be created and terminated only in compliance 
with applicable statutory enabling authority. 
2. In 1890, the State legislature adopted a second 
method for local entities to accept formally the dedication 
of streets for public use upon the recordin0 an approved 
subdivision plat map. Said laws of 1890 as later amended in 
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1394 establish a separate system of property laws applicable 
to the procedure and legal consequence of subdividing land 
which substantially deviates from the common law principles 
reflected in the property law applicable to general 
highways. A developer could select a method of dedication, 
but he and his successors are bound by the legal 
consequ~nces of such choice. 
3. In 1897, when Pearl Street was dedicated as part of 
a recorded subdivision, the applicable subdivision property 
law provided that a fee interest was transferred to the 
public which could only be relinquished or terminated by a 
vacating act of the local municipality or court which has 
not occurred. Consequently, assuming arguendo the claim of 
non-use for five years by 1902, could be proven, the claim 
alone without formal vacation is inadequate to divest the 
public of its superior interest in the dedicated road, being 
contrary to applicable statutes; to-wit, subdivision laws 
and laws. pr oh ibi tng the adverse possession of public 
property. 
4. The existence or non-existence of private property 
rights that would survive any alleged abandonment of the 
public's interest in the street are not at issue or relevant 
herein nor may such rights be adjudicated without 
jurisdiction over the abutting property owner. 
5. In the event, this Court were to find that 
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notwithstanding the foregoing arguments, that prior to 1911 
Section 1116 of Revised Statutes of Utah of 1898 as amended , 
at least created a claim or defense to a dedicator's 
reversionary interest which could divest the public of its 
interests in subdivision streets in contravention of the 
statutory procedure, Respondent-City submits the principles 
of equ~ty and public policy, laches and estoppel, require 
that such claims be cut off as stale, and offensive to the 
stability of property law, equity and public interests. The 
property owners and their predecessors have knowingly 
received the benefits of urban subdivision for 80 years, 
shall receive future benefits to their property by the 
improvement of Street, and shall not be damaged to any 
extent by an order to remove the obstructions and personal 
property from said Street. On the other hand to allow 
Laytons' claim any success would open up uncertainty and 
vulnerability of attack to any subdivision street to century 
old claims thereby inappropriately chilling or stopping the 
natural progress of heavily demanded public services and 
utilities. Such a result would be inimical to the public 
and contrary to the purposes and provisions of the laws 
under which the Street was dedicatd. 
rt is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the Court 
should uphold the lower court decision and rule that said 
street is a dedicated road which should be free from the 
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encroaching or obstructing activities of Appellant-
Laytons. Respondent-City submits this Court should also 
affirm the lower court's order to Appellant-Laytons to 
remove the obstructions from the Street within ten (10) days 
with the Respondent-City being authorized to complete the 
removal upon failure to Defendants-Appellants to comply with 
such order and be awarded a jud3ment for any expense 
involved in such work. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROGER F. CUTLER 
City Attorney 
JUDY F. LEVER 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
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